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Abstract 
This essay challenges concepts that consider the theory of mind to be key to our response to 
narrative from a historical perspective. Although the classical modern novel lends itself to the 
claims of Palmer, Zunshine, and others on account of its prominent consciousness 
presentation, the ancient novel as well as modern paralittérature cannot be adequately 
described as “the description of fictional mental functioning.” An exemplary reading of 
Heliodorus’ Ethiopica draws our attention to an aspect that is in danger of being downplayed 
in cognitive narratology, namely the temporal dynamics of narrative. 
 
 
1. THE THEORY OF MIND IN PSYCHOLOGY AND NARRATOLOGY 
 
The allure of cognitive studies for narratologists is unbroken. Various concepts, 
mostly adapted from soft cognitive science, are recruited to elucidate the interface between 
mind and narrative. “The most popular of these imports,” as Marie-Laure Ryan notes in an 
article titled “Narratology and Cognitive Science: A Problematic Relation” is the “theory of 
mind” (485). The concept of the theory of mind, sometimes also circulating under the label of 
folk psychology, was first developed by comparative psychologists who investigated the 
ability in primates to impute mental states to others (Premack and Woodruff). It was then 
applied to the human mind in developmental psychology and triggered a wave of clinical 
research. Broadly defined as the human capacity to explain the behavior of others in terms of 
their beliefs, feelings, and desires; the theory of mind has been identified by literary scholars 
as a key to the reader’s engagement with narrative across media. 
                                                 
1
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Let me single out the approaches of two particularly influential scholars from the bulk 
of works that claim the notion of theory of mind for literary scholarship.
3
 In two monographs, 
Alan Palmer advances the thesis that “narrative is the description of fictional mental 
functioning” (Fictional Minds 12). 4  Some aspects of “fictional mental functioning” are 
covered by investigations of speech categories, focalization, characterization and plot 
structures, others come to the fore in possible-worlds theory; yet, Palmer reckons that we need 
the new label of “fictional minds” to fully grasp what hitherto had been called the 
presentation of consciousness. Following characters’ fictional mental functioning” is, he 
claims, “the fundamental and principal way by which we understand narrative” (Social Minds 
17). For Palmer, the theory of mind, which helps us to navigate our social world is at the core 
of our response to narrative. 
To describe the reading process thus envisaged, Palmer coins the term “continuing-
consciousness frame,” that is “the ability to take a reference to a character in the text and 
attach it to a presumed consciousness that exists continuously within the story-world between 
the various, more or less intermittent references to that character” (Social Minds 10). The 
readers’ activity produces what Palmer calls “embedded narratives” in his first book and 
“cognitive narratives” in his second book (Social Minds 11–12): “the total perceptual and 
cognitive viewpoint, ideologic worldview, memories of the past, and the set of beliefs, 
desires, intentions, motives, and plans for the future of each character in the story as presented 
in the discourse” (11). It is through such “embedded/cognitive narratives” that readers access 
the story-worlds. 
Palmer offsets his investigation against traditional approaches to the presentation of 
consciousness by focusing on “the social nature of thought” (Fictional Minds 11). Besides 
intramental thought, there is intermental thought. While the former is located within the 
individual mind, the latter is shared by a group, be it a couple, a nation, or a random crowd. 
Believing that socially distributed cognition is important in real life, Palmer argues that it is 
also pervasive in the novel. One of his test-cases is Eliot’s Middlemarch. There is a 
Middlemarch mind formed by the inhabitants of the town embracing various subgroups. 
                                                 
3
 For further recent literary scholarship indebted to the theory of mind, see, e.g., Mar, Djikic, 
and Oatley; Oatley; Leverage et al.; Herman, “Introduction;” and Pagan. 
4
 Cf. Palmer, Social Minds 9: “Fictional narrative is, in essence, the presentation of mental 
functioning.” While advancing close readings of new texts, the theoretical agenda of Social 
Minds is more or less the same as that of Palmer’s Fictional Minds, parts of which are simply 
rephrased or repeated verbatim. 
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Palmer goes out of his way to assert that his use of mind in this case is not metaphorical: “The 
town actually and literally does have a mind of its own” (Social Minds 74). 
Like Palmer, albeit from a different angle, Lisa Zunshine considers the theory of mind 
pivotal to the reading process. In her book Why We Read Fiction, she draws on the work of 
cognitive evolutionary psychologists like Dunbar and Baron-Cohen who understand the 
theory of mind as an evolutionary adaptation: “The emergence of a theory of mind “module” 
was evolution’s answer to the “staggeringly complex” challenge faced by our ancestors, who 
needed to make sense of the behavior of other people in their group, which could include up 
to 200 individuals” (7). Works of fiction, she argues, “provide grist for the mills of our mind-
reading adaptations that have evolved to deal with real people” (16–17). Besides subscribing 
to an evolutionary approach, Why We Read Fiction puts much stock in psychologic 
investigations that explain autism as a drastically reduced ability of mind-reading. “Fiction 
presents a challenge to people with autism because in many ways it calls for the same kind of 
mind-reading—that is, the inference of the mental state from the behavior—that is necessary 
in regular human communication” (11).5 
Zunshine argues that fiction confronts us with multiple embedded levels of 
intentionality that often exceed the complexity of real-life encounters. Here, her take is 
nuanced differently from Palmer’s. While Palmer is inclined to stress the transparency of the 
minds of others in real life, Zunshine gives more space to the possibility of misunderstanding 
and highlights that “the joys of reading fictional minds are subject to some of the same 
instabilities that render our real-life mindreading both exciting and exasperating” (20). 
Nonetheless, novels and other narratives “test the functioning of our cognitive adaptations for 
mind-reading while keeping us pleasantly aware that the “test” is proceeding quite smoothly” 
(Zunshine 18). 
As central as the notion of the theory of mind is in the works of Palmer, Zunshine, and 
other literary scholars, it has been forcefully challenged in recent psychology.
6
 To start with, 
the usage of the term theory of mind varies significantly. Some limit the theory of mind to the 
so-called “theory theory,” that is, approaches that presume that our inferences about other 
people hinge on a theory or quasi-theory of minds. Then the theory of mind is opposed to 
                                                 
5
 Most recently, Zunshine has recanted her position on narrative and autism. In an interview 
with the neuro-scientist Ralph John Savarese, she advocates a dialogue between literary 
studies and the approach of neurodiversity in the sciences (Savarese and Zunshine). 
6
 See, for example, Hutto, “Folk Psychology without Theory;” Folk Psychological Narratives; 
and the contributions to Leudar and Costall, Against Theory of Mind. 
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simulation theories, which identify empathy as the key to our social interactions.
7
 Other 
scholars, however, are happy to subsume both theory theory and simulation theory under the 
heading of theory of mind.
8
 
More disconcerting than such terminological issues are the methodological flaws of 
the experiments on which the theory of mind is premised, especially the “false-belief” task. 
The experiments that test the ability to meta-represent, that is, to distinguish somebody’s 
thought about an object from its reality, not only require no theory or quasi-theory about 
minds, but they also prove nothing about how our interaction with other humans proceeds: 
“...the experiments themselves were stipulative, defining the very phenomenon they claim to 
investigate” (Leudar and Costall 6–7). There are alternative modes of conducting social 
interactions: often social rules permit us to make sense of the behavior of others, and instead 
of inferring the desires and beliefs of others, we can ask them directly (Hutto, “Folk 
Psychology without Theory” 44–46). The experimental focus of theory of mind has also led 
to a neglect of the social circumstances in which communication takes place. Although the 
experiments concentrate on third-person contexts, many of our interactions are second-person 
(Gallagher, How the Body 213). Theory of mind, it appears, is far less salient in our social 
lives than its advocates take for granted. 
It has also been criticized that the theory of mind is predicated on a dualism: the 
juxtaposition of behavior and mind underlying the idea of mind-reading is superseded by 
more recent approaches that aim at integrated and embodied concepts of mind (Leudar and 
Costall 10). Psychologists and philosophers have further marshalled the concept of 
intersubjectivity to identify a primordial connection with other individuals and to question the 
idea of a primary separation between self and other on which the theory of mind is premised 
(Zlatev). The arguments of Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction in particular are challenged by 
the discovery that many people diagnosed with autism are actually able to meta-present 
(Boucher 223–41). To cut a long story short, a glance at recent literature on the mind shows 
that by invoking the theory of mind, literary scholars are building their theories on a cognitive 
approach that has lost much of its luster since the 1990s.
9
 
                                                 
7
 Cf. Goldman. For a juxtaposition of theory theory and simulation theory, see the double 
issue of Mind and Language 7(1–2) 1992. 
8
 E.g., Gallagher, “The Practice of Mind.” See also Palmer, Social Minds 24, who uses the 
term “in a more general sense, as a kind of umbrella or generic label for our ability to 
understand others.” 
9
 It is odd that Herman, The Emergence of Mind adduces some recent critics of the theory of 
mind to destabilize the assumption that we have no access to other minds in the everyday 
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In this essay, I wish to challenge the general claims about the theory of mind and 
narrative, so popular in current scholarship, from a historical perspective, and to highlight an 
aspect that is in danger of being downplayed in cognitive narratology.
10
 Palmer, Zunshine, 
and other disciples of the theory of mind tend to focus on modern narrative, particularly the 
classical modern novel.
11
 This genre lends itself to them on account of its prominent 
consciousness presentation, but once we start to look outside this narrow canon it is hard to 
sustain the assertion that the anthropological significance of narrative is predicated on the 
theory of mind. 
My test-case will be an ancient novel, Heliodorus’ Ethiopica. Although recent work 
shows that character portrayal in the ancient novel is more intricate than has been widely 
assumed, the reader of the Ethiopica does not get much mileage out of the theory of mind. 
Instead Heliodorus’ novel draws our attention to the temporal dynamics of narrative (section 
2). What is more, the reflections on narrative and response encapsulated in the Ethiopica 
highlight that the reader is enticed primarily by such features as suspense and curiosity 
(section 3). If we look beyond the ancient novel, we can see that much narrative, including the 
vast field of paralittérature is invested more in the mimesis and reconfiguration of time than 
the presentation of consciousness (section 4). By no means, however, should time be played 
off against character. Their entwinement in narrative can be grasped, I will finally suggest, by 
the concept of experience, which is also capable of capturing the cognitive processes of 
readers as well as characters (section 5). 
 
 
2. HELIODORUS’ ETHIOPICA: FROM FICTIONAL MINDS TO NARRATIVE TIME 
 
Recent scholarship has been eager to correct the traditional view that the characters in 
the ancient novel are ‘figures without a soul’ (“seelenlose Gestalten,”) merely ‘jointed dolls’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
world, but fails to draw the appropriate conclusions for its applications to narrative. How can 
a theory that is insufficient to account for social interaction furnish a model for our response 
to narrative that claims to be based on everyday cognitive processes? 
10
 For a critical assessment of Zunshine’s approach, see Boyd. A special issue of Style on 
social minds (45[2]) also features essays that are critical of Palmer’s work (see especially 
Bortolussi; Hogan; and Jahn), but while most of these articles disagree with the notion of 
intermental thought, I will try to challenge the application of theory of mind. 
11
 The contributions to Herman, “Introduction” are a noteworthy exception. While not going 
so far as to question the theory of mind, some of the chapters reveal that in premodern 
narrative fictional minds work differently. 
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(“Gliederpuppen”) (Rohde 476). Gender studies in particular have inspired a more refined 
analysis of these novel’s protagonists (Egger; Konstan; Goldhill; Haynes; Jones). Most 
recently, De Temmerman presented a monograph on characterization in the novel from a 
literary point of view (De Temmerman). Mustering the five ancient Greek novels that have 
been fully preserved, he argues that their heroes are by no means only typified, idealistic, and 
static characters, but dynamic, realistically sketched and well individuated. De Temmerman 
challenges in particular Christopher Gill’s take on characterization in ancient literature.12 Gill 
juxtaposes the ancient emphasis onmoral judgment, which constitutes personality in his 
terms, with what he labels character, shaped essentially by introspection and the Cartesian 
idea of selfhood. De Temmerman takes pains to trace the subjective aspects of character in 
the ancient novel. The reader is invited not only to evaluate, but also to understand the 
protagonists. However, the qualifications of De Temmerman and others notwithstanding, the 
heroes in the Greek novels are not portrayed in a way that puts the theory of mind in the 
center of the reader’s response. It is not the consciousness of the characters, but the temporal 
dynamics of the plot that pull the reader into the story. 
I wish to illustrate this claim throughout the Ethiopica. Heliodorus’ novel follows the 
pattern that we know from the other ancient and also early modern romances.
13
 A couple, in 
this case Theagenes and Charicleia, has to brave various ordeals before they are united in 
marriage. After the first scene of the Ethiopica shows us Theagenes and Charicleia on a beach 
at the mouth of the Nile, most of the novel’s first half is taken up by an embedded narrative in 
which the Egyptian priest Calasiris reveals the prehistory: in Delphi, Theagenes meets 
Charicleia, an Ethiopian princess raised by a priest of Apollo. They fall in love and escape 
with his help. After a first series of adventures, notably a sea storm, an encounter with pirates, 
and several men who lust after Charicleia, the hero couple arrives in Egypt. The second half 
of the Ethiopica is more straightforward: undergoing further trials, including separation, 
captivity, and a lecherous woman, Charicleia and Theagenes come to Ethiopia and are finally 
married. 
Written probably in the third or fourth century CE, the Ethiopica has been called “the 
ancient world’s narratological summa” (Lowe 258). Heliodorus had a huge impact on the 
emergence of the modern novel and was extolled by such critics as Scaliger;
14
 nowadays, 
                                                 
12
 See especially Gill, “The Character-Personality Distinction;” Personality in Greek Epic. 
13
 On the plot dynamics of the Ethiopica, see, for example, Lowe 249─58; Whitmarsh 
139─252, for a discussion of the narrative dynamics of all five ideal Greek novels. 
14
 For a survey, see Sandy 95–124. 
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however, his novel is studied mostly by a small, if devoted, group of experts.
15
 As I hope to 
show though, its formal complexity and high degree of reflexivity make it a text worthy of the 
attention of students of narrative. I will begin with the portrayal of the heroine, taking De 
Temmerman’s reading as my touching point, then consider the use of internal focalization in 
the starting scene, and finally discuss Charicleia’s Scheintod at the beginning of book 2. 
According to De Temmerman, two features in particular define Charicleia: mental 
strength (phronema) and chastity (sophrosyne) (246–58). De Temmermann argues that while 
both traits may seem to be static at the beginning, their dynamic and shapable nature comes to 
the fore as the narrative proceeds. Calasiris narrates how Charicleia’s mental strength is 
challenged by her passion for Theagenes and reinforced when she learns about her royal 
descent: noblesse oblige. Charicleia first sees her chastity threatened by Theagenes; she is 
then, however, instructed by Calasiris that only sex, not marriage, is incompatible with 
chastity. This reassessment allows her to keep her vows while eloping with Theagenes. De 
Temmerman stresses Charicleia’s clever use of rhetoric to defend her chastity (258–77). In 
book 1, she successfully fends off the brigand Thyamis who is eager to marry her. Pretending 
to be a priestess of Artemis and the sister of Theagenes, she makes Thyamis postpone his 
marriage plans until they reach Memphis. As we learn later in Calasiris’ narrative, he taught 
her the art of speaking “as a basis for choosing the best way of life” (De Temmerman 264). 
Further on, in the second half of the Ethiopica, Charicleia tries to pass on her skills to 
Theagenes, who has now become the victim of illicit desire. 
De Temmerman brilliantly teases out the nuances of the portrayal of Charicleia. And 
yet, even his overly subtle analysis yields a strictly confined character sketch that throws into 
relief the limits of characterization in the ancient novel. The development for which De 
Temmerman argues is minimal. Neither the reassessment of chastity nor the confirmation of 
mental strength furnishes a serious change of character. Charicleia’s character is tested rather 
than transformed in the way of a modern Bildungsroman. Note also that the traits by which 
Charicleia is defined have a strong moral bearing. Both chastity and mental strength firmly 
belong to the realm of Gill’s personality and do not impinge on the inner features that are part 
of a character. There is far more to evaluate than to understand in Charicleia. 
Most importantly, it is clearly not the character of Charicleia and other protagonists 
that drives the narrative and entices the reader. Take for instance Charicleia’s dealings with 
                                                 
15
 Pavel is a noteworthy exception in granting Heliodorus a prominent place in his genealogy 
of the novel (La pensée). See also Zunshine, who refers to the Ethiopica as an ancient 
example of what she considers a triangulation of minds (“1700-1750”). 
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the head of the brigands, Thyamis, in book 1 (De Temmerman 258–69). Beguiled by 
Charicleia’s beauty, Thyamis falls for Charicleia. Although she is in his hands, he avoids the 
use of force and instead proposes marriage. Charicleia senses that she is not in a position to 
reject this proposal; hence she slyly asks him to wait until she has had a chance to lay down 
her priesthood at the Apollo temple in Memphis. In their exchange, Thyamis reveals himself 
to be a righteous brigand while Charicleia showcases her savviness and shrewdness. That is 
fair enough, but the reader’s attention is directed less at the nuances of their characters than at 
the plot. On the one hand, the reader is bound to wonder about the identity and prehistory of 
Charicleia and Theagenes.
16
 We have followed the beautiful couple from the mouth of the 
Nile to the village of the brigands and still do not know who they are and what brought them 
to the shores of Egypt. Charicleia’s self-identification as the sister of Theagenes is obviously 
a ruse, and yet the reader wonders whether her speech to Thyamis could also feature true 
elements. Her claim that they suffered shipwreck chimes with the tableau of the initial scene, 
but did they actually come from Ephesus and were they really on a religious mission? On the 
other hand, the reader will feel suspense as to whether or not Charicleia’s strategy will work 
out. Thyamis accepts her story, but for how long will she be able to postpone the wedding? 
Once in Memphis, she will have to marry him. It is not so much the psychogram of Charicleia 
and Thyamis as the plot that engages the reader. 
Priority of plot over character can also be noted in other passages. Take for example 
the last book: Theagenes and Charicleia have been caught by the Ethiopian army and are due 
to be sacrificed. Before that, however, they need to undergo a chastity test, as only virgin 
victims are legitimate. This proliferates an intriguing tension: an oracle reported at the end of 
book 2 suggests that Charicleia and Theagenes will eventually be married on account of their 
chastity. Now, however, Charicleia is liable to be sacrificed if she turns out to be a virgin. De 
Temmerman notes that the scene deconstructs both the “Artemisian” and “Apollinian” sides 
of Charicleia, the former concerning her chastity, the latter her rhetorical skills (293–94). 
When Charicleia’s sexual abstinence almost leads to her sacrifice, then “the novelistic topos 
of chastity is fundamentally perverted” (De Temmerman 293). At the same time, Charicleia’s 
rhetorical shrewdness fails to reach its goal this time. She does not manage to convince the 
Ethiopian king and queen that “as their daughter, she is not a suitable victim for sacrifice in a 
                                                 
16
 On the delayed revelation of essential information in the Ethiopica, see Winkler 1990: 296–
307; Morgan, “The Story of Knemon” 265–69. 
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ritual that traditionally requires foreign prisoners of war” (De Temmerman 294). It is only 
through the intervention of the crowd that she will be spared sacrifice. 
De Temmerman nicely teases out how the virginity test undercuts central traits of 
Charicleia’s earlier presentation, and yet his own analysis ultimately drives home that 
character portrayal is not at the core of the scene: “At this point, then, the ‘Artemisian’ side of 
her character, highlighted since the first pages of the novel, turns out to be the main obstacle 
to a happy ending” (293). It is not the presentation of Charicleia’s character in itself, but its 
role as an “obstacle to a happy ending” that arrests the reader’s attention. The virginity test is 
one of many events that creates suspense by veering off into a direction that conflicts with the 
anticipated ending. As John Morgan notes in his fine analysis of the narrative dynamics of the 
Ethiopica’s final book: “The narrative is full of signs that point wrong trails” (“A Sense of 
Ending” 318). Seen in this light, Charicleia’s response to Theagenes’ query of why she does 
not simply reveal her identity to her parents has a meta-narrative quality to it (9.24.4): “Great 
ends can only be achieved by means of equal greatness. A story whose beginnings heaven has 
made convoluted cannot be quickly resolved.”17 
Furthermore, the initial scene of the Ethiopica hammers home that Heliodorus is more 
invested in the dynamics of plot than the intricacies of character: 
 
 “The smile of daybreak was just beginning to brighten the sky, the sunlight 
to catch the hilltops, when a group of men in brigand gear peered over the 
mountain that overlooks the place where the Nile flows into the sea at the 
mouth that men call the Heracleotic. They stood there for a moment, scanning 
the expanse of sea beneath them: first they gazed out over the ocean, but as 
there was nothing sailing there that held out hope of spoil and plunder, their 
eyes were drawn to the beach nearby. This is what they saw: a merchant ship 
was riding there, moored by her stern, empty of crew but laden with freight. 
This much could be surmised even from a distance, for the weight of her 
cargo forced the water up to the third line of boards on the ship’s side. But the 
beach! – a mass of newly slain bodies, some of them quite dead, others half-
alive and still twitching, testimony that the fighting had only just ended. To 
judge by the signs this had been no proper battle. Amongst the carnage were 
the miserable remnants of festivities that had come to this unhappy end. 
There were tables still set with food, and others upset on the ground, held in 
dead men’s hands; in the fray they had served some as weapons, for this had 
been an impromptu conflict; beneath other tables men had crawled in the vain 
hope of hiding there. There were wine bowls upturned, and some slipping 
from the hands that held them; some had been drinking from them, others 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Morgan, “A Sense of Ending” 308–309; Elmer 429–30; Whitmarsh 230–31. 
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using them like stones, for the suddenness of the catastrophe had caused 
objects to be put to strange, new uses, and taught men to use drinking vessels 
as missiles. There they lay, here a man felled by an axe, there another struck 
down by a stone picked up then and there from the shingly beach; here a man 
battered to death with a club, there another burned to death with a brand from 
the fire. Various were the forms of their deaths, but most were the victims of 
arrows and archery. In that small space the deity had contrived an infinitely 
varied spectacle, defiling wine with blood and unleashing war at the party, 
combining wining and dining, pouring of drink and spilling of blood, and 
staging this tragic show for the Egyptian bandits. They stood on the 
mountainside like the audience in a theater, unable to comprehend the scene: 
the vanquished were there, but the victors were nowhere to be seem; the 
victory was unequivocal, but the spoils had not been taken, and the ship lay 
there by herself, crewless but otherwise intact, riding peacefully at anchor as 
if protected by a great force of men. But although they were at a loss to know 
what it all meant, they still had an eye for plunder and a quick profit. So they 
cast themselves in the role of victors and set off down the hillside.” 
 
A camera-like movement gives the description a cinematographic quality:
18
 the 
narrator starts with a pan-shot of the scenery—the reference to “men in thievish attire” is 
restricted to what can be seen—and, in a type of reverse-shot, turns around to adopt the 
viewpoint of these men. Following the movement of their gaze, the narrator describes first the 
sea and then the beach. His report adheres to the perspective of the internal beholders, 
reporting only what they see and reckon without imparting any additional information: “this 
much could be surmised even from a distance ... to judge by the signs this had been no proper 
battle.” The beginning of the Ethiopica is an impressive instance of internal focalization in 
ancient narrative.
19
 
Internal focalization is an important means of giving the reader access to the minds of 
protagonists. It thus figures prominently in studies of “fictional minds.” At the beginning of 
the Ethiopica, however, internal focalization is not used to interest the reader in the 
protagonists whose perspective the narrative adopts. The brigands through whose eyes the 
reader sees the beach play no further role; they simply leave when another group of brigands 
arrives. The limitation of sensual and intellectual perception to the perspective of an internal 
audience serves to put the reader right on the spot of the action. It makes the account mimetic 
                                                 
18
 Cf. Bühler on the cinematographic character of the Ethiopica’s opening. See also Winkler 
289–93; Morgan “Reader and Audiences” 86–90. I am unconvinced by the argument Telò 
makes for far-reaching allusions to the Odyssey in the Ethiopica that imply a predatory 
poetics. 
19
 Cf. Effe 152–7. 
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and bestows on it the graphic vividness that ancient critics label enargeia.
20
 More specifically, 
the enargeia at the beginning of the Ethiopica reinforces the reader’s curiosity, which the 
scenic description is bound to arouse. What has happened on the beach? How can the 
mysterious blending of party with war and wine with blood be explained? Who is the couple 
that the narrator describes in the subsequent paragraphs, a gorgeous girl, statue-like with a 
bow in her hand, and at her feet a young man, heavily injured, but nonetheless of astounding 
beauty? Instead of engaging the reader in the process of mind-reading and involving her with 
the protagonists, the internal focalization on the first pages of the Ethiopica inserts the reader 
into the plot. In an artful play with different storylines and embedded narratives, the Ethiopica 
will continue to tickle the reader’s curiosity—the prehistory which lets the reader understand 
the starting scene will not be revealed fully until the end of book 5. 
By now it should be clear that the Ethiopica fails Palmer’s formula for narrative as a 
“description of fictional mental functioning.” It is not the theory of mind, however 
understood, that grabs the reader’s attention and inserts her into the world of the Ethiopica. 
We do not access the story through “embedded/cognitive narratives;” rather, we are gripped 
by the forceful plot. Of course, the narrator reports on the feelings, motives, and goals of the 
characters. However, what entices the reader are not the rather schematic consciousness 
processes, but the drive of the action. A small but pertinent formal observation reinforces this 
point: there seems to be no free indirect discourse in Heliodorus. A crucial device of 
consciousness presentation in the modern novel is nearly completely missing in the ancient 
novel and in ancient narrative in general.
21
 There are, of course, other means of rendering 
internal reflection, notably direct thought representation and thought report; yet, the absence 
of free indirect discourse, which blends the character’s subjectivity and language with the 
narrator’s voice, is emblematic of the minor role that the presentation of consciousness plays 
in the Ethiopica and other ancient narratives. 
While challenging the claims of Palmer, Zunshine, and others, the examples just 
discussed suggest another model for narrative, a model that has not consciousness but time at 
its core. Suspense and curiosity have emerged to be more prominent than character portrayal. 
They form two of the three master tropes that constitute narrative according to Meir 
Sternberg: “I define narrativity as the play of suspense/curiosity/surprise between represented 
and communicative time (in whatever combination, whatever medium, whatever manifest, or 
                                                 
20
 See Zanker; Manieri; Otto; Webb 87─130. 
21
 Cf. Laird 201–03 on the absence of free indirect discourse from the ancient novel. On free 
indirect discourse in ancient literature, see also Bakker 121–22; Beck 139–40. 
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latent form)” (“Telling in Time [II]” 529). Sternberg’s definition of narrativity has been 
linked to Ricoeur’s understanding of narrative as a mode of coming to grips with time 
(Grethlein, “The Narrative Reconfiguration”). It is the interplay of narrated time with 
narrative time, as described by Sternberg, which reconfigures time and allows the recipient to 
engage with time. The reader is subjected to the same temporal structure as in the everyday 
world albeit without pragmatic strains. The narrative orchestration of time yields a reflection 
on time, not an explicit meditation, of course, but, more profoundly, a playful enactment of 
our temporality in the frame of “as-if”. Given the Ethiopica’s virtuoso play with suspense and 
curiosity, such an approach captures their dynamics much better than theories honing in on 
consciousness presentation. While the first half of the novel has the reader try to grasp the 
prehistory, the second half sends her on a roller coaster of suspense. Both make the reader 
experience the force of time in the safe framework of “as-if.” 
Surprise, Sternberg’s third master trope, also comes into play in the Ethiopica as the 
following example illustrates. In the village of Thyamis and his brigands, Theagenes and 
Charicleia meet a young Athenian, Cnemon, who tells them of his adventures. Roughly 
summarized, Cnemon is the victim of his stepmother, Demainete, whose love he rejected. Out 
of revenge and with the aid of a servant named Thisbe, Demainete schemed against Cnemon, 
who was then driven into exile and, once in Egypt, fell into the hands of the brigands. When 
the village of the brigands is attacked, Thyamis hides Charicleia in a cave. Sensing that the 
battle is lost, he rushes back to the cave to kill her so she will not fall into the hands of his 
enemies. After the raid, Theagenes and Cnemon enter the cave in order to fetch Charicleia. 
Finding a corpse, Theagenes breaks out in an excessive lament. It turns out, however, that 
Charicleia is alive—the corpse is Thisbe’s! 
Heliodorus gives a detailed description of Theagenes’ mourning that is partly rendered 
in direct speech. And yet, the report does not aim at rousing the reader’s empathy through the 
piercing description of an individual’s feelings. Brimming with rhetorical commonplaces, the 
lament rather prepares the surprise that Heliodorus springs on both characters and readers 
when they learn that the corpse is Thisbe’s. Charicleia wonders (2.8.3), “How can someone 
suddenly be spirited away by a sort of theatrical special effect, out of the heart of Greece to 
the remotest parts of Egypt?” In the words of a modern critic: “As if by magic, Thisbe 
emerges from the pre-history and unexpectedly turns out to be directly involved in the main 
action” (Pinheiro 3157). Familiar with the conventions of the novel, the reader may expect 
that the corpse is not Charicleia, but nothing steers her to suspect that it is Thisbe. Only now 
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is the reader informed of how Thisbe also had to leave Athens and finally came to Egypt. 
Note that the readers’ surprise does not hinge on an engagement with the characters’ minds 
but is triggered by the action. The surprise does not require that the readers access the story 
through Theagenes’s “embedded/cognitive narrative”; it is caused by the appearance of 
Thisbe.  
In addition to drawing on Ricoeur in order to grasp the existential dimension of 
narrative time, I think Sternberg’s theory needs to be modified in one important respect. 
Surprise, it seems, is not really equivalent to curiosity and suspense. Whereas the latter two 
describe a durative expectation, surprise is a momentary feeling.
21
 Strangely, the master 
strategy that Sternberg treats first and to which he devotes the most attention is less important 
for the reading process than suspense and curiosity. It is easy, though, to see why surprise has 
this prominent place in his system. Sternberg starts from Aristotle and finds in surprise the 
only element in the Poetics that works well for his approach focusing on the tension between 
narrative and narrated time. It is the Aristotelian heritage that prompts Sternberg to overrate 
the significance of surprise. 
Sternberg’s definition of curiosity as retrospection and of suspense as prospection also 
needs qualification. It makes good sense to distinguish the desire to learn something about the 
past from expectations about the future, but it is important to note that these temporal 
directions refer only to the level of narrated time. Narrated time, however, is mediated by 
narrative time, which only moves forward. Thus, not only in suspense, but also in curiosity, 
which is levelled at the past of narrated time, attention is directed at the future of narrative 
time. While in suspense the prospection towards the futures of narrative and narrated time 
converges, curiosity embeds the retrospective turn to the past of narrated time in the 
prospective movement of reading. As important as the refraction of narrated time in narrative 
time is, it is based on the simple sequence of signs. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I am far from claiming that the Ethiopica lacks the 
presentation of consciousness. There are “fictional minds” in Heliodorus, and yet it is clearly 
not the engagement with them that drives the reading process. Heliodorus speaks loudly 
against the view that the theory of mind is “the fundamental and principal way by which we 
understand narrative” (Palmer, Social Minds 17) and the anthropological reason for our 
infatuation with narrative. He alerts us to the significance of time for narrative, an aspect that 
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has been given ample attention in the Neo-Aristotelian and phenomenological traditions,
22
 but 
receives short thrift from cognitive scholars obsessed with the theory of mind.
23
 Not mind-
reading, but the temporal dynamics of the plot entice the reader of the Ethiopica. Suspense, 
curiosity and surprise let the reader engage with time. 
 
 
3. REFLECTIONS ON NARRATIVE AND TIME IN THE ETHIOPICA 
 
The Ethiopica themselves reflect the significance of the narrative reconfiguration of 
time for captivating readers. Winkler’s seminal paper on “The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the 
Narrative Strategy of Heliodorus’ Aithiopika” has drawn our attention to the novel’s strong 
self-referential dimension. Especially the long embedded narrative in which Calasiris reveals 
the prehistory to Cnemon can be read as a nuanced reflection on narrative and its reception. 
Winkler argued that the Ethiopica’s self-referentiality throws into relief its narrative 
complexity and the need for a sophisticated reader. In this section, I wish to show that the 
temporal dimension of narrative looms large in the Ethiopica’s implicit reflections, 
corroborating my argument for their orientation toward plot. 
In his extended narration, Calasiris reproduces Charicles’ report on how he received 
Charicleia. An Ethiopian ambassador asked him to take care of the child. The ambassador had 
to leave before he could inform him about the origin and identity of the child, but promised to 
do so the next day. However, he did not show up for this meeting (2.32.3): “I trudged home 
with heavy heart, stunned and like those who have received a heavy blow, because I had not 
had the chance to hear all about the girl – who she was, where she came from, who her 
parents were.” “It is not surprising,” said Cnemon. “I am dismayed myself not to have heard. 
But perhaps I shall.” “Indeed you will,” said Calasiris.” Cnemon’s response resembles the 
disappointment Charicles himself felt and simultaneously prefigures that of Heliodorus’ 
reader. The embedded audience, namely Cnemon, signals the alignment of reader with 
character: our curiosity is piqued like that of Charicles. Charicles, Cnemon, and we alike 
puzzle about Charicleia. Cnemon’s response thus reflects the dynamic of curiosity that draws 
the attention of the reader to the prehistory of the plot. 
                                                 
22
 Besides the work of Sternberg, esp. Expositional Modes, “Telling in Time (I),” and “Telling 
in Time (II),” see also Baroni, La tension narrative; L’oeuvre du temps. 
23
 Palmer, Fictional Minds 212─14 has some interesting remarks on the “thought-action 
continuum,” but the few pages he devotes to it highlight that his interest lies with fictional 
minds. 
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At the same time, the brief dialogue intimates the rift between real life and reading 
experiences. While Charicles cannot know whether or not he will learn of Charicleia’s origin 
at some point, Calasiris assures Cnemon and us that our curiosity will be satisfied. Calasiris’ 
reply “indeed you will” highlights the fundamental gap that separates the characters from 
readers. In real life, the future is open and contingent. The universe of narratives, on the other 
hand, is closed. Narrative economy tends to avoid information that is unnecessary. Calasiris’ 
assurance makes explicit the reader’s expectation that questions raised will be answered. 
 Like curiosity, suspense and its spell on the reader of the Ethiopica are reflected in the 
response of internal audiences, for example, in Calasiris’ account of a footrace at Delphi in 
which Theagenes challenges a prize-winning athlete (4.3.2–4.3.4):  
 
“The whole of Greece thrilled with emotion at this dramatic turn of events 
and prayed for Theagenes to win as fervently as if each man were himself 
competing (agōnizomenos); for nothing wins the sympathy of beholders like 
beauty. Charicleia’s emotion passed all bounds; I had been observing her 
carefully for some while and I saw every conceivable expression pass in 
succession over her face. The herald proclaimed the names of those entered 
for the race for all to hear, ‘Ormenos of Arcadia and Theagenes of 
Thessaly.’ The starting gate opened, and they were off, running at such a 
speed that the eye could barely keep pace. Now the maiden could not stay 
still; her feet began to skip and dance, as if, in my estimation, her soul were 
flying together (sunexairomenēs) with Theagenes and sharing his passion 
for the race (sumprothumoumenēs). The viewers were all buoyed up, 
anticipating the outcome, and full of anxiety (agōnias); I myself even more 
so, now that I had decided to care for Theagenes in the future as for a son.” 
“It is not surprising,” said Cnemon, “that those who were there watching 
were anxious (agōnian). Even now, I fear for Theagenes and beg you to 
make haste and tell me whether he was proclaimed victor.” 
 
The passage nests multiple audiences into each other: we read about Cnemon listening 
to an account of the crowd witnessing the scene. The concentric circles of reception bridge the 
gap between reader and action, drawing her close to the footrace. Cnemon prefigures the 
reader in the framing narrative. Through his ears, the reader follows Calasiris’ account that 
puts the internal and external audience into the shoes of the spectators present. The immersion 
of the spectators is explicitly stressed and subtly underlined by the repeated use of the stem 
agōn (agōnizomenos, agōnias, agōnian), which is poetologically charged. Ancient critics 
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refer to the involvement of the reader as agōnia.24 Demetrius’ de elocutione, a treatise on the 
four styles from the Imperial Era, for example, elaborates on suspense as constituting 
enargeia: “One should not say right away what has happened, but unfold it gradually, thus 
keeping the reader in suspense (literally: hanging up, kremonta) and forcing him to share the 
anxiety (sunagōnian)” (216). Heliodorus adopts this critical usage and grafts it onto a literal 
agōn. Using words of the same stem for the race and the beholders’ response highlights their 
absorption by the scene. Cnemon’s comment drives home that the listener is as affected as the 
viewers and makes explicit the workings of suspense that immerse the reader in the story. 
The detailed account of the audience in the stadium illustrates the possibility of a 
variety of responses. All fever with Theagenes, but for distinct reasons and with different 
intensity. The crowd is allured by his beauty; Calasiris’ feelings are even stronger because of 
his care for the runner; and the involvement of Charicleia, who is in love with Theagenes, is 
the most intense. The double use of compound verbs with the prefix sun linguistically 
expresses her bond with Theagenes (sunexairomenēs, sumprothumoumenēs). Charicleia’s 
immersion in his current situation goes so far that she starts moving her feet and thereby 
mimics his running. The graded response of the internal audience underscores the impact of 
identification on suspense. And yet, the different intensities notwithstanding, the entire 
audience is kept on their toes. Suspense is intensified by identification, but does not hinge on 
it.
25
 
The interaction of external and internal responses again merits our attention. When 
Cnemon begs Calasiris to hurry with his recital, he is fully absorbed by the story. The reader, 
however, who is equally eager to learn the outcome of the race, is forcefully reminded of the 
narratorial mediation: she does not witness the footrace, but attends to an account embedded 
in a narrative. Thus, instead of prefiguring the reader’s response, Cnemon’s absorption makes 
the reader reflect on the mediation. In another way, though, Cnemon’s interruption may 
contribute to the spell the text casts on the reader. The retardation heightens suspense and 
thereby helps to bind the reader into the story. Here as in other cases, the responses of internal 
and external audiences do not fully map onto one another, but chafe in multiple ways against 
each other. 
                                                 
24
 In addition to Dem. de eloc. 216 quoted earlier, see, e.g., Ps.-Plut. Hom. 6 and Scholion bT 
Il. 7.479: “The poet rouses the reader beforehand and makes him feel anxious (agōnian) in 
view of the future events.” Cf. Nannini 41–49. 
25
 Cf. Baroni, La tension narrative 271–8. 
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Reflections on narrative suspense are by no means confined to Calasiris’ report. They 
can also be found for instance in Cnemon’s narration of how he came to Egypt (1.14.1–
1.14.2): “Thus I was banished from my family home and the land of my birth; but Demainete, 
enemy to the gods, was not left unpunished. The mode of her punishment you will hear, but 
now it is time for sleep, for we are far into the night and you badly need rest.” “But you only 
afflict us further,” said Theagenes, “if you will leave the wicked Demainete unpunished in 
your story.” The force of narrative suspense is so strong that Theagenes presses Cnemon to go 
on despite the hour and unflinchingly sacrifices his sleep. The phrase “if you will leave the 
wicked Demainete unpunished in your story” is metaleptic in that it suggests a direct 
interaction between narrator and character. The erasure of the boundary between the act of 
narrating and the world of the narrative underscores the immersive capacity of the story. 
This passage is of special interest as it foregrounds the kind of suspense that is most 
prominent in the Ethiopica. Theagenes and Charicleia are informed that Demainete will be 
punished and have to wait to learn about the “mode of her punishment.” Theagenes’ feeling of 
suspense as to how Demainete will find her deserved end prefigures not only the reader’s 
response at this particular juncture, but also mirrors the narrative dynamics of the Ethiopica at 
large. The strong generic conventions of the novel minimize the room for suspense as to what 
will happen. Instead, the suspense triggered by Heliodorus concentrates rather on how the 
known end will be realized. What Baroni calls “suspense moyen” is dominant in the 
Ethiopica (La tension narrative 269–78). 
Theagenes’ desire to see Demainete punished also draws our attention to another 
point: the character of an expected telos can help heighten suspense. Here, the end of 
Demainete is phrased in moral terms. Being ethically charged, the telos gains in momentum 
and enriches the suspense the audience is feeling. This applies to the Ethiopica at large: the 
purity of Charicleia and Theagenes and the depravity of their opponents endow the plot with a 
strong ethical dimension and heighten the reader’s investment. The expectation of the telos is 
reinforced by its moral desirability. 
As these passages illustrate, the reflexivity of the Ethiopica supports the salience of 
the interplay between narrative time and narrated time for which I have argued. While not 
directly prefiguring the response of the Ethiopica’s readers, the reactions of Cnemon and 
other internal audiences illustrate the process of reception. Not mind-reading, but the temporal 
dynamics of plot emerge as its foundation. Suspense and curiosity are pivotal to the 
  
 
Manuscript. Final version published in: Style Vol. 49, No. 3 (2015), pp. 257-284  
characters’ experience of being immersed in the embedded stories and to the reader’s 
absorption into the plot of the Ethiopica. 
 
 
4. BEYOND HELIODORUS 
 
It is difficult to gauge to what extent the modest role of consciousness processes in the 
ancient Greek novel is owed to a concept of selfhood that differs from our modern 
assumptions. One could argue that the limited focus on the characters’ interior lives 
corresponds to a limited notion of self. However, the danger of circular arguments is great 
here, as the novel and other narratives play a crucial role in the reconstruction of ancient ideas 
about identity. What is more, grand narratives about the emergence of the self have been duly 
criticized and there is no lack of Greek texts that do not square with the view that the ancient 
notion of self was rudimentary.
26
 
Inversely, the dominance of plot over character for which I have argued in the ancient 
novel also applies to much narrative in other epochs including the modern Era. The corpus on 
which scholars like Palmer and Zunshine have based their general claims about fictional 
minds is slim indeed, mostly classical modern novels from Middlemarch to Lolita. If we 
venture, for example, into the vast field of what literary scholars label as paralittérature, we 
find similar features as in the ancient novel. Couégnas extracts in his investigation of 
nineteenth-century popular novels and the beginning of the roman policier the following list 
of criteria for paralittérature: besides paratextual elements, repetition, and the significance of 
all elements, the orientation toward plot and the rudimentary treatment of characters.
27
 
Such narratives as adventure novels, crime fiction, and the Western have pervasive 
generic conventions, thrive on suspense, and tend to draw on a cast of more or less 
stereotypical characters. A passage from Ian Fleming’s Casino Royale may illustrate the 
parallels it shares with the Ethiopica. James Bond has just fallen into the hands of the evil Le 
Chiffre: “He [Bond] felt thoroughly dispirited and weak in resolve as well as in his body. He 
had to take too much in the past twenty-four hours and now this last stroke by the enemy 
seemed almost too final. This time there could be no miracles. No one knew where he was 
and no one would miss him until well on into the morning. The wreck of his car would be 
found before very long, but it would take hours to trace ownership to him” (105). As in the 
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Arweiler and Möller. 
27
 For an instructive comparison of the ancient novel with paralittérature, see Fusillo. 
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scenes from the Ethiopica discussed earlier, it is not the hero’s character and his interior life, 
but suspense that grips the reader. Like Heliodorus, Fleming creates a strong tension between 
the present state and the end that is dictated by generic conventions. We know that Bond will 
triumph, and “this last stroke seemed almost too final” gestures clandestinely to the solution 
of the tension. But how, we wonder, will he be able turn around the situation “this time”? As 
in the Ethiopica, it is “suspense moyen” that tickles the reader. 
The parallels between the Ethiopica and James Bond novels are admittedly limited. 
Paralittérature rarely reaches the complexity of the Ethiopica and lacks its self-referential 
sophistication, and yet they are aligned by their plot-orientation. I do not risk much when I 
claim that Ian Fleming, Stephen King, and others enjoy a far broader readership than Henry 
James, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner. This could have various reasons, but it is worth 
noting that the narratives capitalizing on time seem to find a larger audience than narratives 
that privilege the presentation of consciousness at the expense of action. For scholars who 
envisage mind-reading as the core of narrative, this poses a serious problem. 
I am far from claiming that the presentation of consciousness plays no role in the 
ancient novel and in paralittérature. Investigating the presentation of interior processes in 
narrative is a rewarding exercise. Much work indeed remains to be done from a diachronic 
perspective to explore the different presentations and articulations of fictional minds in the 
history of narrative. It is a pity that the high-flying agenda proposed by Palmer in Fictional 
Minds for a second book on the topic has not materialized (240–44). The monograph on 
fictional minds discussing both “the Bible (books from both the Old and New Testament)” 
and “classical narratives” as well as a wide array of modern narratives, as eloquently 
announced and advertised by Palmer over the course of five pages, would have been most 
welcome. And yet, it is easily understandable why Palmer instead wrote a book that 
concentrates on such texts as Middlemarch and Little Dorrit. A serious engagement with 
premodern texts, but also with modern literature beyond his canon makes it difficult to sustain 
the conviction that “following characters’ fictional mental functioning” is “the fundamental 
and principal way by which we understand narrative” (Palmer, Social Minds 17). 
 
 
5. THE ENTWINEMENT OF NARRATIVE TIME WITH CHARACTER: EXPERIENCE 
 
The Ethiopica and modern paralittérature revolt against the concept of narrative as a 
“description of fictional mental functioning.” The reconfiguration of time is more salient than 
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the presentation of consciousness in these and other narratives. By no means though do I wish 
to play off time against character. Both are important components of narrative; what is more, 
they are closely entwined with each other. In a final step, I will touch on this entwinement and 
suggest that the notion of experience is a more fruitful category for cognitive or 
phenomenological approaches to narrative than fictional minds. 
To start with, modern consciousness novels go beyond a pure “description of fictional 
mental functioning” (Palmer, Fictional Minds 12). They show the workings of narrative 
minds as part of a temporal sequence. Thoughts, feelings, and conjectures figure in a plot, 
weak as it may be. While putting much emphasis on processes of consciousness, the classical 
modern novel embeds the portrayal of the inner lives of characters in narrated time. Even 
experiential works that aspire to mimic spatial form are still bound to the sequential form of 
narrative.
28
 On the other hand, action without introspection is in danger of being anemic. 
Narratives that avoid revealing the inner lives of characters provoke the reader into inferring 
their feelings and motives. In reading such stories as Hemingway’s The Killers we must 
constantly make conjectures about the minds of the characters. 
The duplication of time that Sternberg’s definition of narrativity zeros in on comes in 
tandem with a duplication of consciousness. Just as the sequence of reading is grafted onto the 
sequence of the action, the consciousness of the reader parallels the consciousness of the 
characters. The notion of experience, introduced to narratology by Monika Fludernik, seems 
apt to conceptualize the twofold duplication . Let me first point out my understanding of 
experience and then show how it lends itself to describing the reading process as well as the 
unfolding of the plot. My concept of experience deviates significantly from the one Monika 
Fludernik has made popular in narrative studies. For Fludernik, experience can be “quite 
uneventful” and center on “mental situations” (29). Opposing experientiality to the idea of 
plot, she states, with refreshing frankness, “In my view narrative thus properly comes into its 
own in the twentieth century when the rise of the consciousness novel starts to foreground 
fictional consciousness” (27). The historical perspective makes Fludernik’s “natural 
narratology” superior to general claims about narrative and fictional minds, but her approach 
fails to exploit the conceptual capacity of experience.  
A look at continental philosophy can help refine our understanding of experience. The 
hermeneutic tradition provides a concept of experience that is apt to capture the sequential 
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 The classical treatment of spatial narrative is Frank, “Spatial Form,” re-published with 
more material in 1991 (The Idea of Spatial Form). 
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aspect of plot in addition to describing the interior lives of characters. Gadamer in particular 
has emphasized the temporal character of experiences (352-68). Harking back to G. W. F. 
Hegel, he emphasizes that experiences disappoint expectations. They are defined by a reversal 
undergone by our consciousness: “If a new experience of an object occurs to us, this means 
that hitherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better” (359). 29  As 
Gadamer stresses, experiences ought not to be reduced to the insight gained through the 
reversal; they can only be understood as processes. In addition to being essentially temporal, 
experiences also make us sense time: “. . . experience is experience of human finitude” 
(363).
30
 Thus understood, experience grasps not only the interior lives of characters, as the 
notion of mind also does, but additionally the sequential aspect of plot. It conveys the 
temporal dynamics that the notion of mind does not necessarily embrace. 
Not only narrative characters, but also readers have experiences.
31
 We have, as we say, 
reading experiences. It is important though to heed the difference between real-life and 
reading experiences. While the heroes of a novel are tortured or killed, the reader sits 
comfortably in her favorite easy chair. Reading experiences are indirect. And yet, in attending 
to the plot, the reader’s consciousness forms the same chain of protentions and retentions that 
define everyday experiences. The reader retains what has happened and conjectures the future 
course of the plot. Reading thus exposes the consciousness to the same temporal dynamics as 
our everyday life, while bracketing it in the frame of “as-if.” Ancient critics in particular were 
highly sensitive to the intensity that reading experiences can acquire.
32
 Take for example 
Gorgias who comments on the power of words (11.9 DK): “Into those who hear it comes 
fearful fright and tearful pity and mournful longing, and at the successes and failures of 
others’ affairs and bodies the mind suffers, through the words, a suffering of its own.” 
As we see, besides embracing the temporal dynamics of the plot as well as the 
presentation of consciousness, the concept of experience applies, with due qualifications, to 
both the world of the story and to its reception by the reader. The reading experience is 
shaped by its relation to the experiences of the narrative characters.
33
 Depending on how the 
                                                 
29
 Gadamer 1986 (1960): 359 (English tr. 2004: 347): “Wenn wir an einem Gegenstand eine 
Erfahrung machen, so heißt das, daß wir die Dinge bisher nicht richtig gesehen haben und nun 
besser wissen, wie es damit steht”. 
30
 Gadamer 1986 (1960): 363 (English tr. 2004: 351): “Erfahrung ist also Erfahrung der 
menschlichen Endlichkeit”. 
31
 On this, see Grethlein, Experience and Teleology 12─14. 
32
 Cf. Grethlein, “Aesthetic Experiences.” 
33
 Cf. Grethlein, “The Narrative Reconfiguration” 318–27. 
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fabula is transformed into the sjuzet, the reader’s experience can be aligned with or be distinct 
from the characters’ experiences. While Homeric epic for examples capitalizes on tragic irony 
by privileging the reader over its characters, stream of consciousness novels make the reader 
perceive the story-world through the lens of characters. 
And yet, it is important to note that the reading experience is not necessarily mediated 
through the experiences of the protagonists. In a thought-provoking attempt to make the 
model of the embodied reader more dynamic, Karin Kukkonen draws on recent work of 
cognitive research. According to these investigations, our embodied engagement with our 
environment implies predictive inferences about the future that are constantly reassessed on 
the basis of new observations. This, Kukkonen argues, also applies to the reading process. 
The reader not only concentrates on the embodied experience of the characters, but derives 
from it predictions of the further development of the plot. Kukkonen’s model is much more 
sensitive to the temporal dimension of the reading process than other models of the embodied 
reader. And yet, I part company with her when she assumes that the reader’s inferences about 
the future develop from that of the characters, either adopting or re-assessing them against the 
backdrop of further knowledge about the story-world. This may but need not be the case. The 
reading experience is not necessarily grafted onto that of the character; it hinges primarily on 
the sequential form of narrative. 
We have already encountered some examples in the course of the argument, such as 
the reader’s surprise at the appearance of Thisbe in Egypt, which parallels Theagenes’s 
surprise without hinging on it, or the suspense as to how Bond will free himself from a 
seemingly inescapable trap. Let me add a further illustration: when the pyre on which 
Charicleia stands is about to be kindled, the reader feels suspense. This suspense does not 
build on how she or other characters feel and assess her future; it is immediately directed 
toward the further course of the action. The reader wants to know what his going to happen 
next, how the situation can be reconciled with the anticipated ending. The sequential form of 
narrative—whatever the medium—prompts the recipient to conjecture about the further 
course of the plot independently of the content and presentation of fictional minds. That said, 
an analysis of the dynamics of plot needs to take into account the characters’ consciousness, 
as the reading experience receives its special character due to its relation to the experience of 
the characters. Time is the primary dimension of narrative, but it needs to be studied together 
with character. 
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All faults and problems notwithstanding, cognitive approaches have been successful in 
opening new horizons for the study of narrative. They have redirected the focus on reception, 
raising the important question as to how our response to narrative relates to our way of 
monitoring the everyday world. Sadly, the theory of mind which has taken center stage in 
many cognitive studies of narrative is not able to provide a satisfying answer. It is not only 
fiercely criticized in psychology, but also fails to account for a vast amount of narrative. 
Building on the study of the classical modern novel, the theory of mind does not provide a 
key for studying the plot-driven narratives that we find in the ancient novel and modern 
paralittérature. That the focus on mindreading has led scholars to neglect the temporal 
dynamics of narrative is palpable in Palmer’s definition of it as a “description of fictional 
mental functioning.” The lack of terminological precision unveils the lopsidedness of 
Palmer’s concept of fictional minds. The concept of experience is a better tool to grasp the 
relation of processing narrative to processing the everyday world:: besides embracing the 
consciousness processes targeted by the concept of fictional minds, it also captures the crucial 
aspect of time and allows us to do justice to the salience of plot for narrative.  
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